The goal of a Protective Services (PS) mission is to protect the principal (the one being guarded) from all hazards.  This includes hazards caused by personal design, accident, or negligence.  But absolute protection is never possible.  Thus the objective of a PS detail must be to operate in a manner that minimizes the likelihood of an attack and its chances of success.

 

The "deterrence factor" offered by the presence of a PS team is invaluable.  If the protective force is alert and firm in dispatching its responsibilities, the apparent control will be evident.  Voluntary cooperation on the part of the public usually follows.  The acquired atmosphere of command frequently prevents the need for further action.  Sometimes ostentatious display of protective equipment and personnel is needed under some circumstances, such as in a combat zone or a hostile fire zone, to bolster the deterrent factor.

 

Every element of protection must be thoroughly planned in advance.  Every actor movement of the principal and the protective detail must be scrutinized to ensure maximum security.  All personnel must be well briefed on emergency procedures.  They must be able to react instantly and correctly.  Good preventive measures may save the life of the protector as well as the person protected.

 

Planning is critical to success.  Every phase of a protective mission must be carefully planned.  The possibility of unexpected changes requires flexibility in planning such missions.  Alternate and contingency plans should be prepared.  They should cover such circumstances as inclement weather, possible threats, or any other actions that may affect the security of the principal.  Coordination with the host agency as well as other persons involved in the visit is essential.  

 

In all cases, advance work is the key to success. Advance work is the coordination of all security arrangements before the arrival of the principal at each location being visited.  For some missions, advance work is extensive and complex, while other missions may require less.  The extent of the work depends on the threat, the availability of resources and manpower, and the personal desires of the principal or the local commander.

 

As far as possible, protective personnel should adapt themselves to the convenience of the principal.  They should avoid interfering with the principal's official or private functions.  The protection must not unnecessarily interfere with the principal's freedom of action.  His privacy must always be respected.  And every effort must be made not to embarrass him or interfere with his activities.  Protective measures and personnel should always be as unobtrusive as circumstances permit.

 

The resources used to protect the principal depend on the duration of the principal's travels.  They also depend on the kind of public exposure desired by the principal or required by circumstances.  The modes of transportation used, the locations visited, and the ideologies of the population with which the principal will have contact also influence resource use.  So too does the analysis of inherent threats obtained during advance threat information collection.  Support of local police is important.  They may be integrated into the security in depth, and they can provide valuable threat information.

 

Release of personal information about the principal and other members of his party is closely controlled.  Certain details of the itinerary and the security procedures to be employed are also closely controlled.  Security personnel do not discuss or release this information to other than authorized persons.  Particular care is taken with regard to representatives of the press.  Release of information can adversely affect the integrity of the mission. 

 

Generally, PS personnel wear clothing like that worn by the principal.  Sports jackets and slacks of conservative cut and color may be appropriate for informal occasions.  Formal wear, such as a tuxedo, may be required for the Primary Security Officer (PSO) and some members of the team.  Sometimes specialized clothing like swimsuits or ski clothing is needed. 

 

The concept of personal security is based on the principle of "defense in depth."  Coordination and flexibility are the watchwords to organizing a defense in depth.  A series of protective cordons is established around the principal.  The cordons are designed to prevent an attack or absorb its shock to such an extent that the results will not be tragic.  They control the space above, below, and on all sides of the principal.  Movement control within these cordons is normally established by an identification system.  The system may use personal recognition, passes, badges, or even unobtrusive lapel pins.

 

· The inner cordon should be manned by the PSO and protective team members.  This includes the shift leader on larger PS details. 

 

· The middle cordon should be manned by PS trained or experienced law enforcement personnel.

 

· The outer cordon should be manned by local law enforcement personnel.  This cordon comprises surveillance posts, such as observation posts, listening posts, sniper positions, static posts, and response teams.

 

These cordons are fluid in nature and must be flexible to adjust to the situation at hand.  There are no defined areas for these cordons with regard to distance from one to the other.  The distance between cordons is established on a case-by-case basis.  It is based on the threat, location, crowd, personality of the principal, and desires of the chain of command.  The PSO adjust the cordons to fit the situation.

 

Sometimes it may be advantageous to modify classic PS procedures to reduce the notice paid to the principal and his need for protection.  At these times a detail undertakes a "low-profile" operation.  A low-profile operation employs only the protective measures that do not draw unnecessary attention to the principal.  Such operations do not necessarily lessen manpower commitments, nor are they less costly.  The protective coverage becomes more discreet, involves considerable planning and ingenuity, and generally is more difficult to conduct than a high-profile operation.  Often the middle and outer cordons of protection are strengthened, allowing the inner cordon to be less obtrusive.  Low-profile operations do not provide much visible protection close to the principal.  This differs from a high-profile operation.  Keeping a low profile may be, however, the best course of action.  Sometimes the political situation requires it.  Sometimes a principal desires a low-key security operation.

 

Individuals assigned to PS details must be constantly aware of the proper techniques they must employ to successfully accomplish their mission.  Fulfillment of a mission requires close teamwork on behalf of the detail.  This requires a thorough understanding of the individual and collective responsibilities of the members of the detail.  The safety of a principal in a threat situation can only be guaranteed by team members who are physically fit and mentally alert and who possess sufficient expertise to perform their duty in an overall planned response to an emergency situation.

 

Effective communications are vital to an efficient PS detail.  The PSO must be in constant communication with other members of the security force and the security control room or command post.  (In many cases the security control room and the command post are one and the same.)  Two-way radio equipment should be available.  This can be accomplished with hand portable radios.  However, these radios should be equipped with surveillance kits to enable security personnel to use the radios quietly when near the principal.  Radio noise should not be heard by or allowed to disrupt the activities of the principal and party.

 

Hand-held and portable base station frequency modulation radios provide appropriate communications within the PS detail.  Communications between vehicles is maintained by vehicular-mounted radios supplemented by portable radios.  When air cover is provided, special provisions to ensure effective communications between air and ground units must be made.

 

A protective services team is usually broken down into the advance team, the residence and baggage watch and the security detail/protective team. 

 

The mission of the advance team is to precede the principal and conduct on-site security surveys.  The team effects necessary security coordination, making all security arrangements.  When the PSO arrives at each location to be visited a member of the advance team meets him and provides information concerning local security arrangements.  When appropriate, the advance team provides the PSO with details of the visit, including maps, sketches, names of people involved, telephone numbers, and so forth.  Once the advance team has gathered all available information, they go to the places to be visited by the principal well ahead of his scheduled arrival.  Sometimes they go as much as weeks in advance depending on the duration of travel by the principal.  Upon arrival at these locations, the advance team contacts identified points of contact, commanders, protocol officers, and other people designated to assist with the advance work.  Duties of the advance team at each locality include, but are not limited to, establishing effective working relations with the host agency and conducting security checks of places and equipment with which the principal will be involved.

 

When traveling with a principal, the residence watch and baggage teams are normally part of the advance team.  However, a residence watch functions at all times for a permanently located detail.  One of the most sensitive areas is the principle's residence.  The residence watch is normally responsible for the security of the residence.  It also establishes the command post. It is responsible for organizing and coordinating security arrangements with the responsible individual from each facility under its charge.  The residence watch also performs advance actions at hotels, motels, and military reservations and facilities.  The primary purpose of the baggage team is to maintain accountability of all items of personal and official property belonging to the principal and the members of the official party who are traveling with or closely associating the principal.  The primary function is to protect all items from loss or theft and to prevent the introduction of foreign objects or explosives into the principal's aircraft, vehicle, or residence.

 

The protective team is normally composed of the PSO and the other members of the PS detail in the closest proximity to the principal.  On larger details the protective team would normally form a protective formation for routine walking movements around a principal.  The protective team should remain close to the principal at all times, changing their relative position frequently.  Security personnel must ensure that an assailant is unable to get between the principal and the protective detail.

 

Before any person is allowed to approach the principal or his personal property, he should be checked to establish his identity and the authority for his presence.  This is especially true at the principal's residence, at public and sporting events, and near the principal's means of transportation.  Whenever possible, the protective team should obtain advance lists of expected guests, visitors, press representatives, and people performing services for the principal.

 

The protective team and residence watch should quickly learn to recognize all employees, regular visitors, members of the official party, and any public figures who are expected to call.  No stranger should be admitted without the permission of the principal or a member of his staff.

 

Because a protective team is usually small, effective security often depends on the voluntary cooperation of the public.  Friendly consideration for the public, especially the press, and a clear portrayal of the need for security stimulates the cooperation of the public and the press.  Inquiries or requests not related to security matters should be referred to the appropriate member of the official party.  Security personnel should refrain from unnecessary conversation with the public and, most of all, with the press.

 

In a majority of instances, the safety of a principal is most critical when he is among the public and walking through crowds, into buildings, and to public events in which he will participate.  If possible, the selection of walking time and routes should be varied.  Accompanying PS detail members should be dispersed so they can cover all avenues of access to the principal.  They should continually adjust their relative positions to ensure that no attacker is able to get between the protectors and the principal.  During outdoor walks, the principal's motorcade should cruise in the immediate vicinity.  The automobile can block any vehicle that may threaten the principal's safety.  It can also be used to transport the principal in case an emergency develops, or it appears necessary to seek a safer location.

 

Escorting a principal requires being highly alert to surrounding areas.  Particular emphasis is placed on people in crowds who are either participating in the event or are drawn to the area out of curiosity.  Close-in security should be established immediately around the principal.  Additional concentric cordons of defense are added to the greatest possible extent.

 

At indoor assemblies, typical defense cordons should be formed immediately around the principal.  They are also formed around the confines of the room occupied by the principal and around the grounds where the building is located.  The personnel manning the defensive cordons should take control of the area before the arrival of guests or the general public.  A careful search and an inspection of the area should be made at the time protection is established.  The area is then secured until opened to the public.

Protective Services